Giorgio Buccellati, Critique of Archaeological Reason
Excerpts and Synopses

Hollinger


Excerpts from 1976 "Aspects of the Theory of Classification"


Page 319 Three general approaches to philosophical issues about classification:
Naturalism: involves the search for a natural classification, i.e. a conceptual system which "divides nature at its joins" in such a way as to make such knowledge possible. Modified conventionalism: holds that at least part of such a program must be fulfilled by making use of social or linguistic conventions.Radical conventionalism:holds that the very distinction between what is natural and what is conventional is impossible to draw; or rather that each language draws it differently, so what counts as natural varies with, and depends upon which language and theory.
Page 324 Hampshire's Scepticizm (Thought and Action: 1959):
There is no theoretically determinable limit to the variety of new types of classification that may be introduced. There will be as many new types of classification as there will be new forms of social life and cooperation among men....description of reality is essentially inexhaustible.
Page 325 The Role of Language in Classification:
.....some authors have called "linguistic relativism and determinism" which is (roughly) the view that the language we speak determines the way we classify and describe the world, where "the world" itself varies with, and is determined by, these languages so that there is one way of describing the-world-as-it-is which is more correct than all others, even for scientific purposes.
Page 328 The Diversity in Classification:
For the sort of diversity in classification which the relativist make use of can perfectly well be explained naturalistically, i.e., in terms of differences in belief, interests, needs, environments, ets., and not conventionalistically, i.e. on the hypothesis that we are prisoners of our language and culture. On this view, differences in classifications may be based upon differences in knowledge and belief, interests and purposes. So the fact that eskimos have more classification of snow than we do no more precludes the assumption that there is only one correct natural classification - at least relative to specific goals - than does the fact that a zoologist uses different classifications than the layman precludes the view that, for scientific purposes, there may be only one set of natural classifications namely natural kinds.
Page 330 The Essentialist Perspective:
Hollinger aims to discover the essential traits of species, we have to favor some classifications and descriptions over others; in particular, we have to rely on scientifically acceptable classifications which can eventuate in the discovery of natural kinds and real essences. If so, an inegalitarian attitude towards some classification will be justified. This does not prove that (say) Socrates essential traits can be discovered independently of the was he is classified but it does show that some way of classifying him, i.e. some classifications are rationally preferable for scientific purposes.
Page 330-31 Pragmatic Opacity:
What Hollinger defends may best be called "pragmatic opacity". The idea is that not always the objects of reference or senses that change with changes in descriptions or classifications but rather that some descriptions and classifications are more appropriate in some context. If this is so, then a classification of an object will be more appropriately used in some context and for some purposes without implying either that a) that object has property O if and only if that classification is used as a frame of reference; or that there will be a change in reference, sense, or truth value with respect to statements about that object when some other classification is used.